Risk Shocks and Housing Supply: A Quantitative Analysis by Lee, Gabriel et al.
                             Elsevier Editorial System(tm) for Review of Economic Dynamics 
                                  Manuscript Draft 
 
 
Manuscript Number: RED-11-79 
 
Title: Risk Shocks and Housing Supply: A Quantitative Analysis  
 
Article Type: Regular Article 
 
Keywords: agency costs, credit channel, time-varying uncertainty, residential investment, housing 
production, calibration 
 
Corresponding Author: Dr. Kevin D Salyer,  
 
Corresponding Author's Institution: University of California, Davis 
 
First Author: Kevin D Salyer 
 
Order of Authors: Kevin D Salyer; Gabriel Lee; Victor Dorofeenko 
 
Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of uncertainty in a multi-sector housing model with financial 
frictions. We include time varying uncertainty (i.e. risk shocks) in the technology shocks that affect 
housing production. The analysis demonstrates that risk shocks to the housing production sector are a 
quantitatively important impulse mechanism for the business cycle. Also, we demonstrate that 
bankruptcy costs act as an endogenous markup factor in housing prices; as a consequence, the 
volatility of housing prices is greater than that of output, as observed in the data. The model can also 
account for the observed countercyclical behavior of risk premia on loans to the housing sector. 
 
 
 
 
         
       
 
Kevin D. Salyer      
Professor of Economics 
One Shields Avenue 
University of California 
Davis, CA 95616 
phone: 530.554.1185 
fax: 530.752.9382 
email: kdsalyer@ucdavis.edu 
 
February 16, 2011 
 
 
Editorial Office, Review of Economic Dynamics 
525 B Street, Suite 1900 
San Diego, CA 92101-4495, USA 
 
Dear Editors:   
 
Please consider for publication in the Review of Economic Dynamics the attached manuscript, "Risk Shocks 
and Housing Supply: A Quantitative Analysis," co-authored with Gabriel Lee and Victor Dorofeenko. As 
directed, the manuscript has been submitted via the online submission web site. 
 
I certainly appreciate your editorial efforts and look forward to hearing from you in the near future. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Kevin Salyer 
Cover Letter
Research highlights "Risk Shocks and Housing Supply: A Quantitative Analysis" 
 We study housing in a multi-sector DSGE model that includes a lending channel. 
 We introduce risk shocks (time varying uncertainty) in the production of housing. 
 Bankruptcy costs affect housing prices and house price volatility. 
 With risk shocks, the model matches the observed volatility of housing prices. 
*Research Highlights
February 2011
Risk Shocks and Housing Supply: A Quantitative Analysis
Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of uncertainty in a multi-sector housing model with nancial frictions. We
include time varying uncertainty (i.e. risk shocks) in the technology shocks that a¤ect housing produc-
tion. The analysis demonstrates that risk shocks to the housing production sector are a quantitatively
important impulse mechanism for the business cycle. Also, we demonstrate that bankruptcy costs act as
an endogenous markup factor in housing prices; as a consequence, the volatility of housing prices is greater
than that of output, as observed in the data. The model can also account for the observed countercyclical
behavior of risk premia on loans to the housing sector.
 JEL Classication: E4, E5, E2, R2, R3
 Keywords: agency costs, credit channel, time-varying uncertainty, residential investment, housing
production, calibration
Victor Dorofeenko
Department of Economics and Finance
Institute for Advanced Studies
Stumpergasse 56
A-1060 Vienna, Austria
Gabriel S. Lee
IREBS
University of Regensburg
Universitaetstrasse 31
93053 Regensburg, Germany
And
Institute for Advanced Studies
Kevin D. Salyer (Corresponding Author)
Department of Economics
University of California
Davis, CA 95616
Contact Information:
Lee: ++49-941.943.5060; E-mail: gabriel.lee@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de
Salyer: (530) 554-1185; E-mail: kdsalyer@ucdavis.edu
We wish to thank David DeJong, Aleks Berenten, Andreas Honstein, and Alejandro Badel for useful comments
and suggestions. We also benetted from comments received during presentations at: the Humboldt University,
University of Basel, European Business School, Latin American Econometric Society Meeting 2009, AREUEA 2010,
University of Wisconsin-Madison and Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago: Housing- Labor-Macro-Urban Conference
April 2010 and SED July 2010. We are especially indebted to participants in the UC Davis and IHS Macroeconomics
Seminar for insightful suggestions that improved the exposition of the paper. We also gratefully acknowledge
nancial support from Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen Nationalbank (Jubiläumsfondsprojekt Nr. 13040).
*Manuscript
1 Introduction
Given the recent macroeconomic experience of most developed countries, few students of the
economy would argue with the following three observations: 1. Financial intermediation plays
an important role in the economy. 2. The housing sector is a critical component for aggregate
economic behavior and 3. Uncertainty, and, in particular, increased uncertainty is a quantitatively
important source of business cycle activity. However, while an extensive research literature is
associated with each of these ideas individually, there are none that we know of which studies
their joint inuences and interactions.1 The research presented here attempts to ll this void;
in particular, we analyze the role of time varying uncertainty (i.e. risk shocks) in a multi-sector
real business cycle model that includes housing production (developed by Davis and Heathcote,
(2005)) and a nancial sector with lending under asymmetric information (e.g. Carlstrom and
Fuerst, (1997), (1998); Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer, (2008)). We model risk shocks as a mean
preserving spread in the distribution of the technology shocks a¤ecting house production and
explore quantitatively how changes in uncertainty a¤ect equilibrium characteristics.
Our aim in examining this environment is twofold. First, we want to develop a framework
that can capture one of the main components of the recent nancial crises, namely, changes in
the risk associated with the housing sector. In our analysis, we focus entirely on the variations in
risk associated with the production of housing and the consequences that this has for lending and
economic activity. Hence our analysis is very much a fundamental-based approach so that we side-
step the delicate issue of modeling housing bubbles and departures from rational expectations. The
results, as discussed below, suggest (to us) that this conservative approach is warranted.2 Second,
1 Some of the recent works which also examine housing and credit are: Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) and
Iacoviello and Neri (2008) in which a new-Keynesian DGSE two sector model is used in their empirical analysis;
Iacoviello (2005) analyzes the role that real estate collateral has for monetary policy; and Aoki, Proudman and
Vliegh (2004) analyse house price amplication e¤ects in consumption and housing investment over the business
cycle. None of these analyses use risk shocks as an impulse mechanism. Some recent papers that have examined
the e¤ects of uncertainty in a DSGE framework include Bloom et al. (2008), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2009),
and Christiano et al. (2008). The last paper is most closely related to the analysis presented here in that it also
uses a credit channel model.
2 In a closely related analysis, Kahn (2008) also uses a multi-sector framework in order to analyze time variation
in the growth rate of productivity in a key sector (consumption goods). He demonstrates that a change in regime
growth, combined with a learning mechanism, can account for some of the observed movements in housing prices.
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we want to cast the analysis of risk shocks in a model that is broadly consistent with some of
the important stylized facts of the housing sector such as: (i) residential investment is about
twice as volatile as non-residential investment and (ii) residential investment and non-residential
investment are highly procyclical.3 Hence, we view our analysis as more of a quantitative rather
than qualitative exercise.
With this in mind, we employ the Davis and Heathcote (2005) housing model which, when
calibrated to the U.S. data, can replicate the high volatility observed in residential investment
despite the absence of any frictions in the economy. The recent analysis in Christiano et al.
(2008), however, provides compelling evidence that nancial frictions do play an important role
in business cycles and, given the recent nancial events, it seems reasonable to investigate this
role when combined with a housing sector.4 Consequently, we modify the Davis and Heathcote
(2005) analysis by adding a nancial sector in the economy and require that housing producers
must nance their inputs via loans from the banking sector. While this modication improves
the model upon some dimensions, a notable discrepancy between model output and the data is
the volatility of housing prices; this inconsistency was also prominent in the original Davis and
Heathcote (2005) analysis. However, when risk shocks are added to the production of housing,
the model is capable of producing house price volatility consistent with observation. But this
comes at the cost of excess volatility in several real variables such as residential investment. We
nd that adding adjustment costs to housing production with a quite reasonable value for the
adjustment cost parameter eliminates this excess volatility in the real side while still matching
the standard deviation of housing prices. We demonstrate that housing prices in our model are
a¤ected by expected bankruptcies and the associated agency costs; these serve as an endogenous,
time-varying markup factor a¤ecting the price of housing. When risk shocks are added to the
3 One other often mentioned stylized fact is that housing prices are persistent and mean reverting (e.g. Glaeser
and Gyourko (2006)). See Figure 1 and Table 4 for these cyclical and statistical features during the period of 1975
until the second quarter of 2007.
4 Christiano et al. (2008) use a New Keynesian model to analyze the relative importance of shocks arising in
the labor and goods markets, monetary policy, and nancial sector. They nd that time-varying second moments,
i.e. risk shocks, are quantitatively important relative to the the other impulse mechanisms.
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model, volatility in this markup translates into increased volatility in housing prices. Moreover,
the model implies that this endogenous markup to housing as well as the risk premium associated
with loans to the housing sector should be countercyclical; both of these features are seen in the
data.5
Our analysis also nds that plausible calibrations of the model with time varying uncertainty
produce a quantitatively meaningful role for uncertainty over the housing and business cycles.
For instance, we compare the impulse response functions for aggregate variables (such as output,
consumption expenditure, and investment) due to a 1% increase in technology shocks to the
construction sector to a 1% increase in uncertainty to shocks a¤ecting housing production. We
nd that, quantitatively, the impact of risk shocks is almost as great as that from technology
shocks. This comparison carries over to housing market variables such as the price of housing, the
risk premium on loans, and the bankruptcy rate of housing producers. The model is not wholly
satisfactory in that it can not account for the lead-lag structure of residential and non-residential
investment but this is not surprising given that the analysis focuses entirely on the supply of
housing. Still, we think the approach presented here provides a useful start in studying the e¤ects
of time-varying uncertainty on housing, housing nance and business cycles.
2 Model Description
As stated above, our model builds on two separate strands of literature: Davis and Heathcotes
(2005) multi-sector growth model with housing, and Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyers (2008) credit
channel model with time-varying uncertainty. For expositional clarity, we rst briey outline our
variant of the Davis and Heathcote model and then introduce the credit channel model.
5 In addition to these cyclical features, a marked feature of the housing sector has been the growth in residential
and commercial real estate lending over the last decade. As shown in Figure 2, residential real estate loans (excluding
revolving home equity loans) account for approximately 50% of total lending by domestically chartered commercial
banks in the United States over the period October 1996 to July 2007. Figure 3 shows the strong co-movement
between the amount of real estate loans and house prices.
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2.1 Production
2.1.1 Firms
The economy consists of two agents, a consumer and an entrepreneur, and four sectors: an in-
termediate goods sector, a nal goods sector, a housing goods sector and a banking sector. The
intermediate sector is comprised of three perfectly competitive industries: a building/construction
sector, a manufacturing sector and a service sector. The output from these sectors are then com-
bined to produce a residential investment good and a consumption good which can be consumed
or used as capital investment; these sectors are also perfectly competitive. Entrepreneurs com-
bine residential investment with a xed factor (land) to produce housing; this sector is where the
lending channel and nancial intermediation play a role.
Turning rst to the intermediate goods sector, the representative rm in each sector is char-
acterized by the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
xit = k
i
it (nit exp
zit)1 i (1)
where i = b;m; s (building/construction, manufacture, service), kit; nit;and zit are capital, house-
hold labor, and a labor augmenting productivity shock respectively for each sector, with i being
the share of capital for sector i.6 In our calibration we set b < m reecting the fact that
the manufacturing sector is more capital intensive (or less labor intensive) than the construction
sector.
Productivity in each sector exhibits stochastic growth as given by:
zit = t log (gz;i) + ~zit (2)
6 Real estate developers, i.e. entrepreneurs, also provide labor to the intermediate goods sectors. This is
a technical consideration so that the net worth of entrepreneurs, including those that go bankrupt, is positive.
Labors share for entrepreneurs is set to a trivial number and has no e¤ect on output dynamics. Hence, for
expositional purposes, we ignore this factor in the presentation.
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where gz;i is the trend growth rate in sector i.
The vector of technology shocks, ~z = (~zb; ~zm; ~zs), follows an AR (1) process:
~zt+1 = B  ~zt + ~"t+1 (3)
The innovation vector ~" is distributed normally with a given covariance matrix ".7
These intermediate rms maximize a conventional static prot function every period. That is,
at time t; the objective function is:
max
fkit;nitg
(X
i
pitxit   rtkit   wtnit
)
(4)
which results in the usual rst order conditions for factor demand:
rtkit = ipitxit; wtnit = (1  i)pitxit (5)
where rt; wt, and pit are the capital rental, wage, and output prices (with the consumption good
as numeraire).
The intermediate goods are then used as inputs to produce two nal goods, yj , where j = c; d
(consumption/capital investment and residential investment respectively). This technology is also
assumed to be Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale:
yjt = 
i=b;m;s
x1
ij
ijt ; j = c; d: (6)
7 In their analysis, Davis and Heathcote (2005) introduced a government sector characterized by non-stochastic
tax rates and government expenditures and a balanced budget in every period. We abstract from these features
in order to focus on time varying uncertainty and the credit channel. Our original model included these elements
but it was determined that they did not have much inuence on the policy functions that characterize equilibrium
(although they clearly inuence steady-state values).
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Note that there are no aggregate technology shocks in the model. The input matrix is dened by
x1 =
0BBBBBB@
bc bd
mc md
sc sd
1CCCCCCA ; (7)
where, for example, mj denotes the quantity of manufacturing output used as an input into sector
j. The shares of construction, manufactures and services for sector j are dened by the matrix
 =
0BBBBBB@
Bc Bd
Mc Md
Sc Sd
1CCCCCCA : (8)
The relative shares of the three intermediate inputs di¤er in producing the two nal goods. For
example, in the calibration of the model, we set Bc < Bd to represent the fact that residential
investment is more construction input intensive relative to the consumption good sector. The
rst degree homogeneity of the production processes implies
P
i ij = 1; j = c; d while market
clearing in the intermediate goods markets requires xit =
P
j x1ijt; i = b;m; s:
With intermediate goods as inputs, the nal goods rms solve the following static prot
maximization problem at t (as stated earlier, the price of consumption good, pct; is normalized to
1):
max
xijt
8<:yct + pdtydt  X
j
X
i
pitx1ijt
9=; (9)
subject to the production functions (eq.(6)) and non-negativity of inputs.
The rst order conditions associated with prot maximization are given by the typical marginal
conditions
pitx1ijt = ijpjtyjt; i = b;m; s; j = c; d (10)
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Constant returns to scale implies zero prots in both sectors so we have the following relationships:
X
j
pjtyjt =
X
i
pitxit = rtkt + wtnt (11)
Finally, new housing structures, yht, are produced by entrepreneurs (i.e. real estate developers)
using the residential investment good, ydt; and land, xlt; as inputs. This sector is discussed below
following the description of the household and nancial sectors.
2.1.2 Households
The representative household derives utility each period from consumption, ct; housing, ht, and
leisure, 1 nt; all of these are measured in per-capita terms. Instantaneous utility for each member
of the household is dened by the Cobb-Douglas functional form of
U(ct; ht; 1  nt) =

cct h
h
t (1  nt)1 c h
1 
1   (12)
where c and h are the weights for consumption and housing in utility, and  represents the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. It is assumed that population grows at the (gross) rate of  so
that the households objective function is written as:
E0
1X
t=0
()
t
U(ct; ht; 1  nt) (13)
Each period agents combine labor income with income from capital and land and use these to
purchase consumption, new housing and investment. In the purchase of housing (addition to the
existing housing stock), agents interact with the nancial intermediary which o¤ers one unit of
housing for the price of pht units of consumption. As described below, the nancial intermediary
lends these resources to risky entrepreneurs who use them to buy the inputs into the housing
production. For the household, these choices are represented by the per-capita budget constraint
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and the laws of motion for per-capita capital and housing:
wtnt + rtkt + pltxlt = ct + ikt + phtiht (14)
kt+1 = kt (1  k) +G (ikt; ikt 1) (15)
ht+1 = ht (1  h) +G (iht; iht 1) (16)
where ikt is capital investment, iht is housing investment, k and h are the capital and house
depreciation rates respectively.8 The function G () is used to introduce adjustment costs into
both capital and housing accumulation. For both stocks, we use the same functional form:
G (izt; izt 1) = izt

1  S

izt
izt 1

; z = (h; k) (17)
It is assumed that S (1) = S0 (1) = 0 and S00 (1) = z > 0; z = (h; k); this is su¢ cient structure
on the function given that we log-linearize the economy when solving for equilibrium. As shown
by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), the parameter z is the inverse of the elasticity
of housing (capital) investment with respect to a temporary change in the shadow price of the
housing (capital) stock, denoted qht (qkt) : For more on the properties of this form of adjustment
costs (which, importantly, a¤ect the second derivative of the law of motion of capital rather than
the usual rst derivative), the reader is directed to Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
It is also important to note that we follow Davis and Heathcote (2005) in that ht denotes
e¤ective housing units. Specically, they exploit the geometric depreciation structure of housing
structures in order to derive ht. Furthermore, they derive the law of motion for e¤ective housing
units (in a model that does not include agency costs) and demonstrate that the depreciation
rate h is related to the depreciation rate of structures. As discussed in their analysis, it is not
8 Note that lower case variables for capital, labor and consumption represent per-capita quantities while upper
case denote will denote aggregate quantities.
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necessary to keep track of the stock of housing structures as an additional state variable; the
amount of e¤ective housing units, ht, is a su¢ cient statistic.
The optimization problem leads to the following necessary conditions which represent, respec-
tively, the Euler conditions associated with capital, housing, and the intra-temporal labor-leisure
decision:
U1t = U1tqktG1 (ikt; ikt 1) + Et [U1t+1qkt+1G2 (ikt+1; ikt)] (18)
U1tqkt = Et [U1t+1 (rt+1 + qkt+1 (1  ))] (19)
U1tpht = U1tqhtG1 (iht; iht 1) + Et [U1t+1qht+1G2 (iht+1; iht)] (20)
U1tqht = Et [U1t+1 (1  h) qht+1 + U2t+1] (21)
wt =
U3
U1
: (22)
As mentioned above, the terms qkt and qht denote the shadow prices of capital and housing, re-
spectively. Note that in the absence of adjustment costs (so that G1 (ikt; ikt 1) = G1 (iht; iht 1) =
1 and G2 (ikt+1; ikt) = G2 (iht+1; iht) = 0), these shadow prices are 1 and pht as expected. These
Euler equations have the standard marginal cost = marginal benet interpretations. For instance,
the left-hand side of eq.(21) is the marginal cost of purchasing additional housing; at an optimum
this must equal the expected marginal utility benet of housing which comes from the capital value
of undepreciated housing and the direct utility that additional housing provides. The shadow price,
qht; used in this calculus is, in turn, related to the price of housing and the utility costs associated
with housing adjustment costs as reected in eq. (20) : The equations associated with capital have
an analogous interpretation.
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2.2 The Credit Channel
2.2.1 Housing Entrepreneurial Contract
The economy described above is identical to that studied in Davis and Heathcote (2005) except
for the addition of productivity shocks a¤ecting housing production.9 We describe in more detail
the nature of this sector and the role of the banking sector. It is assumed that a continuum
of housing producing rms with unit mass are owned by risk-neutral entrepreneurs (developers).
The costs of producing housing are nanced via loans from risk-neutral intermediaries. Given
the realization of the idiosyncratic shock to housing production, some real estate developers will
not be able to satisfy their loan payments and will go bankrupt. The banks take over operations
of these bankrupt rms but must pay an agency fee. These agency fees, therefore, a¤ect the
aggregate production of housing and, as shown below, imply an endogenous markup to housing
prices. That is, since some housing output is lost to agency costs, the price of housing must be
increased in order to cover factor costs.
The timing of events is critical:
1. The exogenous state vector of technology shocks and uncertainty shocks, denoted (zi;t; !;t),
is realized.
2. Firms hire inputs of labor and capital from households and entrepreneurs and produce
intermediate output via Cobb-Douglas production functions. These intermediate goods are
then used to produce the two nal outputs.
3. Households make their labor, consumption, housing, and investment decisions.
4. With the savings resources from households, the banking sector provide loans to entrepre-
neurs via the optimal nancial contract (described below). The contract is dened by the
size of the loan (fpat) and a cuto¤ level of productivity for the entrepreneurstechnology
9 Also, as noted above, we abstract from taxes and government expenditures.
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shock, !t.
5. Entrepreneurs use their net worth and loans from the banking sector in order to purchase
the factors for housing production. The quantity of factors (residential investment and land)
is determined and paid for before the idiosyncratic technology shock is known.
6. The idiosyncratic technology shock of each entrepreneur is realized. If !at  !t the entre-
preneur is solvent and the loan from the bank is repaid; otherwise the entrepreneur declares
bankruptcy and production is monitored by the bank at a cost proportional (but time vary-
ing) to total factor payments.
7. Solvent entrepreneurs sell their remaining housing output to the bank sector and use this
income to purchase current consumption and capital. The latter will in part determine their
net worth in the following period.
8. Note that the total amount of housing output available to the households is due to three
sources: (1) The repayment of loans by solvent entrepreneurs, (2) The housing output net of
agency costs by insolvent rms, and (3) the sale of housing output by solvent entrepreneurs
used to nance the purchase of consumption and capital.
A schematic of the implied ows is presented in Figure 5.
For entrepreneur a, the housing production function is denoted F (xalt; yadt) and is assumed
to exhibit constant returns to scale. Specically, we assume:
yaht = !atF (xalt; yadt) = !atx

alty
1 
adt (23)
where,  denotes the share of land. It is assumed that the aggregate quantity of land is xed and
equal to 1. The technology shock, !at, is an idiosyncratic shock a¤ecting real estate developers.
The technology shock is assumed to have a unitary mean and standard deviation of !;t. The
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standard deviation, !;t; follows an AR (1) process:
!;t+1 = 
1 
0 

!;t exp
";t+1 (24)
with the steady-state value 0;  2 (0; 1) and ";t+1 is a white noise innovation.10
Each period, entrepreneurs enter the period with net worth given by nwat: Developers use this
net worth and loans from the banking sector in order to purchase inputs. Letting fpat denote the
factor payments associated with developer a, we have:
fpat = pdtyadt + pltxalt (25)
Hence, the size of the loan is (fpat   nwat) : The realization of !at is privately observed by each
entrepreneur; banks can observe the realization at a cost that is proportional to the total input
bill.
It is convenient to express these agency costs in terms of the price of housing. Note that agency
costs combined with constant returns to scale in housing production (see eq. (23)) implies that
the aggregate value of housing output must be greater than the value of inputs; i.e. housing must
sell at a markup over the input costs, the factor payments. Denote this markup as st (which is
treated as parametric by both lenders and borrowers) which satises:
phtyht = stfpt (26)
Also, since E (!t) = 1 and all rms face the same factor prices, this implies that, at the individual
10 This autoregressive process is used so that, when the model is log- linearized, ^!;t (dened as the percentage
deviations from 0) follows a standard, mean-zero AR(1) process.
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level, we have11
phtF (xalt; yadt) = stfpat (27)
Given these relationships, we dene agency costs for loans to an individual entrepreneur in terms
of foregone housing production as stfpat:
With a positive net worth, the entrepreneur borrows (fpat   nwat) consumption goods and
agrees to pay back
 
1 + rLt

(fpat   nwat) to the lender, where rLt is the interest rate on loans.
The cuto¤ value of productivity, !t, that determines solvency (i.e. !at  !t) or bankruptcy
(i.e. !at < !t) is dened by
 
1 + rLt

(fpat   nwat) = pht!tF () (where F () = F (xalt; yadt))
. Denoting the c:d:f: and p:d:f: of !t as  (!t;!;t) and  (!t;!;t), the expected returns to a
housing producer is therefore given by:12
Z 1
!t

pht!F () 
 
1 + rLt

(fpat   nwat)

 (!;!;t) d! (28)
Using the denition of !t and eq. (27), this can be written as:
stfpatf (!t;!;t) (29)
where f (!t;!;t) is dened as:
f (!t;!;t) =
Z 1
!t
! (!;!;t) d!   [1   (!t;!;t)] !t (30)
Similarly, the expected returns to lenders is given by:
Z !t
0
pht!F () (!;!;t) d! + [1   (!t;!;t)]
 
1 + rLt

(fpat   nwat)  (!t;!;t)stfpat (31)
11 The implication is that, at the individual level, the product of the markup (st) and factor payments is equal
to the expected value of housing production since housing output is unknown at the time of the contract. Since
there is no aggregate risk in housing production, we also have phtyht = stfpt:
12 The notation (!;!;t) is used to denote that the distribution function is time-varying as determined by the
realization of the random variable, !;t.
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Again, using the denition of !t and eq. (27), this can be expressed as:
stfpatg (!t;!;t) (32)
where g (!t;!;t) is dened as:
g (!t;!;t) =
Z !t
0
! (!;!;t) d! + [1   (!t;!;t)] !t    (!t;!;t) (33)
Note that these two functions sum to:
f (!t;!;t) + g (!t;!;t) = 1   (!t;!;t) (34)
Hence, the term  (!t;!;t) captures the loss of housing due to the agency costs associated
with bankruptcy. With the expected returns to lender and borrower expressed in terms of the
size of the loan, fpat; and the cuto¤ value of productivity, !t; it is possible to dene the optimal
borrowing contract by the pair (fpat; !t) that maximizes the entrepreneurs return subject to the
lenders willingness to participate (all rents go to the entrepreneur). That is, the optimal contract
is determined by the solution to:
max
!t;fpat
stfpatf (!t;!;t) subject to stfpatg (!t;!;t) > fpat   nwat (35)
A necessary condition for the optimal contract problem is given by:
@ (:)
@!t
: stfpat
@f (!t;!;t)
@!t
=  tstfpat @g (!t;!;t)
@!t
(36)
where t is the shadow price of the lenders resources. Using the denitions of f (!t;!;t) and
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g (!t;!;t), this can be rewritten as:13
1  1
t
=
 (!t;!;t)
1   (!t;!;t) (37)
As shown by eq.(37), the shadow price of the resources used in lending is an increasing function
of the relevant Inverse Mills ratio (interpreted as the conditional probability of bankruptcy) and
the agency costs. If the product of these terms equals zero, then the shadow price equals the cost
of housing production, i.e. t = 1.
The second necessary condition is:
@ (:)
@fpat
: stf (!t;!;t) = t [1  stg (!t;!;t)] (38)
These rst-order conditions imply that, in general equilibrium, the markup factor, st; will be
endogenously determined and related to the probability of bankruptcy. Specically, using the rst
order conditions, we have that the markup, st; must satisfy:
s 1t =
"
(f (!t;!;t) + g (!t;!;t)) +
 (!t;!;t)f (!t;!;t)
@f(!t;!;t)
@!t
#
(39)
=
266641   (!t;!;t)| {z }
A
   (!t;!;t)
1   (!t;!;t)f (!t;!;t)| {z }
B
37775
First note that the markup factor depends only on economy-wide variables so that the aggregate
markup factor is well dened. Also, the two terms, A and B, demonstrate that the markup factor is
a¤ected by both the total agency costs (term A) and the marginal e¤ect that bankruptcy has on the
entrepreneurs expected return. That is, term B reects the loss of housing output, ; weighted by
the expected share that would go to entrepreneurs, f (!t;!;t) ; and the conditional probability of
13 Note that we have used the fact that
@f(!t;!;t)
@!t
= (!t;!;t)  1 < 0
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bankruptcy (the Inverse Mills ratio). Finally, note that, in the absence of credit market frictions,
there is no markup so that st = 1. In the partial equilibrium setting, it is straightforward to show
that equation (39) denes an implicit function ! (st; !;t) that is increasing in st.
The incentive compatibility constraint implies
fpat =
1
(1  stg (!t;!;t))nwat (40)
Equation (40) implies that the size of the loan is linear in entrepreneurs net worth so that
aggregate lending is well-dened and a function of aggregate net worth.
The e¤ect of an increase in uncertainty on lending can be understood in a partial equilibrium
setting where st and nwat are treated as parameters. As shown by eq. (39), the assumption that
the markup factor is unchanged implies that the costs of default, represented by the terms A and
B, must be constant. With a mean-preserving spread in the distribution for !t, this means that
!t will fall (this is driven primarily by the term A). Through an approximation analysis, it can
be shown that !t  g (!t;!;t) (see the Appendix in Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2008)). That
is, the increase in uncertainty will reduce lendersexpected return (g (!t;!;t)). Rewriting the
binding incentive compatibility constraint (eq. (40)) yields:
stg (!t;!;t) = 1  nwat
fpat
(41)
the fall in the left-hand side induces a fall in fpat. Hence, greater uncertainty results in a fall in
housing production. This partial equilibrium result carries over to the general equilibrium setting.
The existence of the markup factor implies that inputs will be paid less than their marginal
products. In particular, prot maximization in the housing development sector implies the fol-
lowing necessary conditions:
plt
pht
=
Fxl (xlt; ydt)
st
(42)
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pdt
pht
=
Fyd (xlt; ydt)
st
(43)
These expressions demonstrate that, in equilibrium, the endogenous markup (determined by the
agency costs) will be a determinant of housing prices.
The production of new housing is determined by a Cobb-Douglas production with residential
investment and land (xed in equilibrium) as inputs. Denoting housing output, net of agency
costs, as yht; this is given by:
yht = x

lty
1 
dt [1   (!t;!;t)] (44)
In equilibrium, we require that iht = yht; i.e. households housing investment is equal to housing
output. Recall that the law of motion for housing is given by eq. (16) :
2.2.2 Entrepreneurial Consumption and House Prices
To rule out self-nancing by the entrepreneur (i.e. which would eliminate the presence of agency
costs), it is assumed that the entrepreneur discounts the future at a faster rate than the household.
This is represented by following expected utility function:
E0
P1
t=0 ()
t
cet (45)
where cet denotes entrepreneurs per-capita consumption at date t; and  2 (0; 1) : This new
parameter, , will be chosen so that it o¤sets the steady-state internal rate of return due to
housing production.
Each period, entrepreneurs net worth, nwt is determined by the value of capital income and
the remaining capital stock.14 That is, entrepreneurs use capital to transfer wealth over time
14 As stated in footnote 6, net worth is also a function of current labor income so that net worth is bounded
above zero in the case of bankruptcy. However, since entrepreneurs labor share is set to a very small number, we
ignore this component of net worth in the exposition of the model.
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(recall that the housing stock is owned by households). Denoting entrepreneurs capital as ket , this
implies:15
nwt = k
e
t [rt + 1  ] (46)
The law of motion for entrepreneurial capital stock is determined in two steps. First, new
capital is nanced by the entrepreneursvalue of housing output after subtracting consumption:
ket+1 = phtyahtf (!t;!;t)  cet = stfpatf (!t;!;t)  cet (47)
Note we have used the equilibrium condition that phtyaht = stfpat to introduce the markup,
st, into the expression. Then, using the incentive compatibility constraint, eq. (40), and the
denition of net worth, the law of motion for capital is given by:
ket+1 = k
e
t (rt + 1  )
stf (!t;!;t)
1  stg (!t;!;t)   c
e
t (48)
The term stf (!t;!;t) = (1  stg (!t;!;t)) represents the entrepreneurs internal rate of return
due to housing production; alternatively, it reects the leverage enjoyed by the entrepreneur since
stf (!t;!;t)
1  stg (!t;!;t) =
stfpatf (!t;!;t)
nwt
(49)
That is, entrepreneurs use their net worth to nance factor inputs of value fpat; this produces
housing which sells at the markup st with entrepreneurs retaining fraction f (!t;!;t) of the value
of housing output.
Given this setting, the optimal path of entrepreneurial consumption implies the following Euler
equation:
1 = Et

(rt+1 + 1  ) st+1 f (!t+1;!;t+1)
1  st+1g (!t+1;!;t+1)

(50)
15 For expositional purposes, in this section we drop the subscript a denoting the individual entrepreneur.
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Finally, we can derive an explicit relationship between entrepreneurs capital and the value of
the housing stock using the incentive compatibility constraint and the fact that housing sells at
a markup over the value of factor inputs. That is, since phtF (xalt; yadt) = stfpt, the incentive
compatibility constraint implies:
pht

xlty
1 
dt

= ket
(rt + 1  )
1  stg (!t;!;t) st (51)
Again, it is important to note that the markup parameter plays a key role in determining housing
prices and output.
2.2.3 Financial Intermediaries
The banks in the model act as risk-neutral nancial intermediaries that, in equilibrium, earn zero
prots. There is a clear role for banks in this economy since, through pooling, all aggregate
uncertainty of housing production can be eliminated. The banking sector receives deposits from
households and, in return, agents receive a housing for a certain (i.e. risk-free) price. Hence, in
this model, nancial intermediaries act more like an aggregate housing cooperative rather than a
typical bank.
3 Equilibrium
Prior to solving for equilibrium, it is necessary to express the growing economy in stationary form.
Given that preferences and technologies are Cobb-Douglas, the economy will have a balanced
growth path. Hence, it is possible to transform all variables by the appropriate growth factor. As
discussed in Davis and Heathcote (2005), the output value of all markets (e.g. pdyd; yc; pixi for
i = (b;m; s)) are growing at the same rate as capital and consumption, gk: This growth rate, in
turn, is a geometric average of the growth rates in the intermediate sectors: gk = g
Bc
zb g
Mc
zmg
Sc
zs : It is
also the case that factor prices display the normal behavior along a balanced growth path: interest
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Table 1: Growth Rates on the Balanced Growth Path
nb; nm; ns; n; r 1
kb; km; ks; k; c; yc; w gk =
h
g
Bc(1 b)
zb g
Mc(1 m)
zm g
Sc(1 s)
zs
i(1=(1 Bcb Mcm Scs))
bc; bd; xb gb = g
b
k g
1 b
zb
mc;md; xm gm = g
m
k g
1 m
zm
sc; sd; xs gs = g
s
k g
1 s
zs
yd gd = g
Bh
b g
Mh
m g
Sh
s
xl gl = 
 1
yh; h gh = g

l g
1 
d
phyh; pdxd; plxl; pbxb; pmxm; psxs gk
rates are stationary while the wage in all sectors is growing at the same rate. The growth rates
for the various factors are presented in Table 1 (again see Davis and Heathcote (2005) for details).
These growth factors were used to construct a stationary economy; all subsequent discussion is in
terms of this transformed economy.
Equilibrium in the economy is described by the vector of factor prices (wt; rt) ; the vector of
intermediate goods prices, (pbt; pmt; pst) ; the price of residential investment (pdt), the price of
land (plt) ; the price of housing (pht) ; the shadow prices associated with housing and capital (due
to adjustment costs) (qht; qkt)), and the markup factor (st) : In total, therefore, there are eleven
equilibrium prices. In addition, the following quantities are determined in equilibrium: the vector
of intermediate goods (xmt; xbt; xst) ; the vector of labor inputs (nmt; nbt; nst) ; the total amount of
labor supplied, (nt) ;the vector of inputs into the nal goods sectors (bct; bdt;mct;mdt; sct; sdt), the
vector of capital inputs (kmt; kbt; kst) ; entrepreneurial capital (ket ) ; household investment (kt+1) ;
the vector of nal goods output (yct; ydt) ;the technology cuto¤ level (!t) ; the e¤ective housing
stock (ht+1) ; and the consumption of households and entrepreneurs (ct; cet ) : In total, there are 24
quantities to be determined; adding the eleven prices, the system is dened by 35 unknowns.
These are determined by the following conditions:
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Factor demand optimality in the intermediate goods markets
rt = i
pitxit
kit
(3 equations) (52)
wt = (1  i) pitxit
nit
(3 equations) (53)
Factor demand optimality in the nal goods sector:
pctyct =
pbtbct
Bc
=
pmtmct
Mc
=
pstsct
S c
(3 equations) (54)
pdtydt =
pbtbdt
Bd
=
pmtmdt
Md
=
pstsdt
S d
(3 equations) (55)
Factor demand in the housing sector (using the fact that, in equilibrium xlt = 1) produces two
more equations:
plt
pht
=
y1 dt
st
(56)
pdt
pht
=
(1  ) y dt
st
(57)
The households necessary conditions provide 5 more equations:
1 = qktG1 (ikt; ikt 1) + Et

U1t+1
U1t
qkt+1G2 (ikt+1; ikt)

(58)
qkt = Et

U1t+1
U1t
(rt+1 + qkt+1 (1  ))

pht = qhtG
0
1 (iht; iht 1) + Et

qht+1G
0
2 (iht+1; iht)
U 01t+1
U 01t

(59)
qht = Et

(1  h) qht+1
U 01t+1
U 01t
+
U 02t+1
U 01t

(60)
wt =
U3(ct; ht; 1  nt)
U1(ct; ht; 1  nt) : (61)
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The nancial contract provides the condition for the markup and the incentive compatibility
constraint:
s 1t =
"
(f (!t;!;t) + g (!t;!;t)) +
 (!t;!;t)f (!t;!;t)
@f(!t;!;t)
@!t
#
(62)
phty
1 
dt = k
e
t
(rt + 1  )
1  stg (!t;!;t) st (63)
The entrepreneurs maximization problem provides the following Euler equation:
1 = Et

(rt+1 + 1  ) st+1 f (!t+1;!;t+1)
1  st+1g (!t+1;!;t+1)

(64)
To these optimality conditions, we have the following market clearing conditions:
Labor market clearing:
nt =
X
i
nit; i = b;m; s (65)
Market clearing for capital:
kt =
X
i
kit; i = b;m; s (66)
Market clearing for intermediate goods:
xbt = bct + bdt; xmt = mct +mdt; xst = sct + sdt: (67)
The aggregate resource constraint for the consumption nal goods sector (i.e. the law of motion
for capital)
kt+1 = (1  )kt + yct   ct   cet (68)
The law of motion for the e¤ective housing units:
ht+1 = (1  h)ht + y1 dt (1   (!t)) (69)
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The law of motion for entrepreneurs capital stock:
ket+1 = k
e
t
(rt + 1  )
1  stg (!t;!;t) stf (!t;!;t)  c
e
t (70)
Finally, we have the production functions. Specically, for the intermediate goods markets:
xit = k
i
it (nit exp
zit)1 i ; i = b;m; s (71)
For the nal goods sectors, we have:
yct = b
Bc
ct m
Mc
ct s
Sc
ct (72)
ydt = b
Bd
dt m
Md
dt s
Sd
dt (73)
These provide the required 35 equations to solve for equilibrium. In addition there are the laws
of motion for the technology shocks and the uncertainty shocks.
~zt+1 = B  ~zt + ~"t+1 (74)
!;t+1 = 
1 
0 

!;t exp
";t+1 (75)
To solve the model, we log linearize around the steady-state. The solution is dened by 35
equations in which the endogenous variables are expressed as linear functions of the vector of
state variables (zbt; zmt; zst; !t; kt; ket ; ht) :
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Table 2: Key Preference and Production Parameters
Depreciation rate for capital:  0.056
Depreciation rate for e¤ective housing (h): h 0.014
Lands share in new housing:  0.106
Population growth rate:  1.017
Discount factor:  0.951
Risk aversion:  2.00
Consumptions share in utility: c 0.314
Housings share in utility: h 0.044
Leisures share in utility: 1-c   h 0.642
Table 3: Intermediate Production Technology Parameters
B M S
Input shares for consumption/investment good (Bc;Mc; Sc) 0.031 0.270 0.700
Input shares for residential investment (Bd;Md; Sd) 0.470 0.238 0.292
Capitals share in each sector (b; m; s) 0.132 0.309 0.237
Sectoral trend productivity growth (%) (gzb; gzm; gzs) -0.27 2.85 1.65
4 Calibration and Data
A strong motivation for using the Davis and Heathcote (2005) model is that the theoretical
constructs have empirical counterparts. Hence, the model parameters can be calibrated to the
data. We use directly the parameter values chosen by the previous authors; readers are directed to
their paper for an explanation of their calibration methodology. Parameter values for preferences,
depreciation rates, population growth and lands share are presented in Table 2. In addition, the
parameters for the intermediate production technologies are presented in Table 3.16
As in Davis and Heathcote (2005), the exogenous shocks to productivity in the three sectors
are assumed to follow an autoregressive process as given in eq. (3). The parameters for the vector
autoregression are the same as used in Davis and Heathcote (2005) (see their Table 4, p. 766 for
details). In particular, we use the following values (recall that the rows of the B matrix correspond
16 Davis and Heathcote (2005) determine the input shares into the consumption and residential investment good
by analyzing the two sub-tables contained in the Use table of the 1992 Benchmark NIPA Input-Output tables.
Again, the interested reader is directed to their paper for further clarication.
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to the building, manufacturing, and services sectors, respectively):
B =
0BBBBBB@
0:707 0:010  0:093
 0:006 0:871  0:150
0003 0:028 0:919
1CCCCCCA
Note this implies that productivity shocks have modest dynamic e¤ects across sectors. The con-
temporaneous correlations of the innovations to the shock are given by the correlation matrix:
 =
0BBBBBB@
Corr ("b; "b) Corr ("b; "m) Corr ("b; "s)
Corr ("m; "m) Corr ("m; "s)
Corr ("s; "s)
1CCCCCCA =
0BBBBBB@
1 0:089 0:306
1 0:578
1
1CCCCCCA
The standard deviations for the innovations were assumed to be: (bb; mm; ss) = (0.041, 0.036,
0.018).
For the nancial sector, we use the same loan and bankruptcy rates as in Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) in order to calibrate the steady-state value of !t, denoted $; and the steady-state standard
deviation of the entrepreneurs technology shock, 0. The average spread between the prime and
commercial paper rates is used to dene the average risk premium (rp) associated with loans to
entrepreneurs as dened in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); this average spread is 1:87% (expressed
as an annual yield). The steady-state bankruptcy rate (br) is given by  ($;0) and Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) used the value of 3.9% (again, expressed as an annual rate). This yields two
equations which determine ($;0):17
 ($;0) = 3:90
$
g ($;0)
  1 = 1:87 (76)
17 Note that the risk premium can be derived from the markup share of the realized output and the amount of pay-
ment on borrowing: st!tfpt = (1 + rp) (fpt   nwt) : And using the optimal factor payment (project investment),
fpt; in equation (40), we arrive at the risk premium in equation (76).
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yielding $  0:65, 0  0:23.18
The entrepreneurial discount factor  can be recovered by the condition that the steady-state
internal rate of return to the entrepreneur is o¤set by their additional discount factor:


sf ($;0)
1  sg ($;0)

= 1
and using the mark-up equation for s in eq. (39), the parameter  then satises the relation
 =
gU
gK

1 +
 ($;0)
f 0 ($;0)

 0:832
where, gU is the growth rate of marginal utility and gK is the growth rate of consumption (identical
to the growth rate of capital on a balanced growth path). The autoregressive parameter for the
risk shocks, , is set to 0.90 so that the persistence is roughly the same as that of the productivity
shocks.
The nal two parameters are the adjustment cost parameters (k; h) : In their analysis of
quarterly U.S. business cycle data, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) provide estimates
of k for di¤erent variants of their model which range over the interval (0:91; 3:24) (their model
did not include housing and so there was no estimate for h). Since our empirical analysis involves
annual data, we choose a lower value for the adjustment cost parameter and, moreover, we impose
the restriction that k = h. We assume that h = h = 0:2 implying that the (short-run)
elasticity of investment and housing with respect to a change in the respective shadow prices
is 5 (i.e. the inverse of the adjustment cost parameter). Given the estimates in Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), we think that these values are certainly not extreme. We also
solve the model with no adjustment costs. As discussed below, the presence of adjustment costs
improves the behavior of the model in several dimensions.
18 It is worth noting that, using nancial data, Gilchrist et al. (2008) estimate 0 to be equal to 0.36 so our
value is broadly in line with theirs.
26
Table 4: Business Cycle Properties (1975:1 - 2007:2)
Data: all series are Hodrick-Prescott ltered
with the smoothing parameter set to 1600
% S.D.
GDP 1:2
Consumption 0:69
House Price Index (HPI) 1:9
Non - Residential Fixed Investment (NRFI) 4:5
Residential Fixed Investment (RFI) 8:7
Correlations
GDP, Consumption 0:83
GDP, HPI 0:31
GDP, HPI (for pre 1990) 0:21
GDP, HPI (for post 1990) 0:51
NRFI, RFI 0:29
GDP, NRFI 0:81
GDP, RFI 0:30
GDP, Real Estate Loans (from 1985:1) 0:15
Real Estate Loans, HPI 0:47
Lead - Lag correlations i =  3 i = 0 i = 3
GDPt; NRFIt i 0:47 0:78 0:31
GDPt; RFIt i  0:27 0:20 0:32
NRFIt i; RFIt 0:63 0:26  0:27
Figure 1 and Table 4 show some of the cyclical and statistical features of the U.S. economy for
the period from 1975 through the second quarter of 2007 using quarterly data.19 As mentioned in
the Introduction, the stylized facts for housing are readily seen. i): Housing prices are much more
volatile than output; ii) Residential investment is almost twice as volatile as non-residential invest-
ment; iii) GDP, consumption, the price of housing, non-residential - and residential investment all
co-move positively; iv) and lastly, residential investment leads output by three quarters.
19 Note that quarterly data is used here only to present some of the broad cyclical features of the data. As
mentioned in the text, we follow Davis and Heathcote (2005) and use annual data when calibrating the model. In
comparing the model output to the data, we employ annual data for this exercise.
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Table 5: Steady - State Values (Relative to GDP)
Variables Lending channel model Davis and Heathcote Data
(D & H) (1948 - 2007)
Capital Stock (K) 1.96 1.52 1.43
Residential structures stock(Pd  S) 3.20 1.00 1.00
Private consumption (PCE = c+ rhh) 0.77 0.64 0.65
Nonresidential investment (ic) 0.18 0.14 0.13
Residential investment (id) 0.05 0.04 0.05
Construction (b = pbxb) 0.05 0.05 0.05
Manufacturing (m = pmxm) 0.24 0.25 0.31
Services (psxs + rhh) 0.71 0.71 0.63
5 Results
5.1 Steady State Values, Second Moments and Lead - Lag Patterns
Table 5 shows some of the selected steady-state values (relative to steady-state GDP) from our
model that includes the lending channel. These steady state values di¤er somewhat from those in
Davis and Heathcote (2005) but the calibrated parameter values produce steady-state values that
are broadly in line with the data.20
Our main interest is in the business cycle, i.e. second moment, properties of the model, and
the roles that risk shocks and adjustment costs play in a¤ecting these properties. To that end,
we rst examine the importance of risk shocks in a model with no adjustment costs, then add
adjustment costs to both stocks (capital and housing) individually and jointly, and conclude with
some impulse response functions that help to illuminate the internal workings of the model
5.1.1 The Role of Risk Shocks
In order to examine the roles of risk shocks and the credit channel mechanism for house production,
we compare simulated data generated under two scenarios. In the rst case, only technology shocks
to the intermediate sectors are present. This is identical to Davis and Heathcotes (2005) analysis
20 As in Davis and Heathcote (2005), GDP is calculated as gdpt = yct + pdtydt + rhtht where rht is the rental
rate of housing and is determined by the marginal rate of substitution between housing and consumption. Also
note that private consumption (PCE) and services includes the rental value of housing.
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Table 6: Standard Deviations relative to S.D.(GDP) - No adjustment costs
Variables Lending channel model (D & H) Data (+ 2s.d.)
(in relation to GDP) (1948 - 2007)
Volatility of ! 0.0 0.21
Private consumption (PCE) 0.51 0.55 0.48 0.78 (+ 0.15)
Labor (N ) 0.39 0.51 0.41 1.01 (+ 0.20)
Nonresidential investment (ic) 3.05 5.19 3.21 2.51 (
+
 0.45)
Residential investment (id) 3.56 22.94 6.12 5.04 (
+
 0.98)
House price (ph) 0.37 1.33 0.4 1.36 (+ 0.31)
Construction output (xb) 3.22 10.64 4.02 2.74 (+ 0.53)
Manufacturing output (xm) 1.51 1.47 1.58 1.85 (+ 0.36)
Service output (xs) 0.98 1.05 0.99 0.85 (+ 0.16)
Construction labor (nb) 1.55 10.27 2.15 2.37 (+ 0.45)
Manufacturing (nm) 0.38 0.39 0.39 1.53 (
+
 0.30)
Service (ns) 0.37 0.61 0.37 0.66 (+ 0.13)
Construction Investment (ib) 1.93 10.36 25.9 9.69 (+ 1.88)
Manufacturing Investment (im) 1.05 1.02 3.23 3.53 (+ 0.69)
Service Investment (is) 1.03 1.10 3.43 2.91 (
+
 0.46)
Markup (s) 0.33 3.65 0.96 (+ 0.22)
Risk premium (RP ) 0.12 1.48 20.6 (4.92)
and so the role of the lending mechanism is highlighted. We then add risk shocks and set the
volatility of the risk shocks so that the model matches the volatility of housing prices. The
results from this exercise are presented in Tables (6) and (7); also included in the Tables are the
corresponding values from Davis and Heathcote (2005) and the data. As a crude estimate of a
95% condence interval, a two-standard deviation value is given and model values that fall within
this range are reported in bold type.
As seen in Table (6), in the absence of risk shocks, the model output is quite similar to that in
Davis and Heathcote (2005). The main di¤erence is that the lending channel mutes the volatility
of residential investment (id) and the volatility of the related intermediate sectors. In particular,
construction investment (ib) and manufacturing investment (im) are too low in the housing channel
model. A critical deciency is that the model can not replicate the volatility of housing prices
(also true for the Davis and Heathcote (2005) framework). It is also worth noting that the two
variables introduced by the housing channel, namely the markup (s) and the risk premium (RP )
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Table 7: Correlations
Variables Lending channel model D & H Data (+ 2s.d.)
! 0 0.21
(GDP;PCE) 0.96 0.82 0.95 0.79 (+0.08,-0.12)
(GDP; ph) 0.71 0.09 0.65 0.73 (+0.13,-0.22)
(ic; PCE) 0.89 0.64 0.91 0.61 (+0.15,0.20)
(id; PCE) 0.42 -0.19 0.26 0.66 (+0.13,-0.18)
(ic; id) 0.26 -0.79 0.15 0.25 (+0.23,-0.27)
(id; ph) -0.68 -0.69 -0.2 0.34 (+0.22,-0.26)
(s; ph) -0.21 0.83 0.55 (+0.21,-0.30)
(s;GDP ) -0.20 -0.20 0.11 (+0.33,-0.36)
(RP;GDP ) 0.20 -0.19 -0.65 (+0.29,-0.18)
exhibit much less volatility than seen in the data. When risk shocks are added, the volatility
of housing prices is increased and matches (by construction) that seen in the data. But this
increased volatility in housing prices produces counterfactual volatility in residential investment
(id) and construction labor (nb). On a more positive note, the volatility of construction investment
(ib) is now in line with the data. The risk shocks, as expected, result in a dramatic increase in
the volatility of the markup and risk premium but the former variable is now too volatile while
the latter remains too smooth relative to the data.
Turning to the contemporaneous correlations of some key variables as reported in Table (7),
we again see that the housing model per se does not change too many of the features seen in the
original Davis and Heathcote (2005) model. Note a key discrepancy between both models and
the data is the correlation between residential investment and housing prices: in the data these
variables co-move positively while, in the models, they are negatively correlated. Adding risk
shocks does not improve matters along this dimension but also produces counterfactual negative
correlations between residential investment and consumption, Corr (id; PCE), and residential
investment and housing prices, Corr (id; ph). These results are not surprising in that all of the
shocks (technology shocks and risk shocks) are primarily supply shocks so that a (relatively)
stable demand curve for housing is observed. Also, risk shocks are akin to a investment specic
technology shock which typically moves investment and consumption in opposite directions (e.g.
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Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000)). More favorably, the correlation between the markup
variable and housing prices becomes positive in the presence of risk shocks and the risk premium
is negatively correlated with GDP; both of these features are seen in the data. The markup and
GDP are negatively correlated in the model and fall within the 95% condence interval estimated
from the data.
The conclusion from this exercise is that the inclusion of risk shocks in the credit chan-
nel/housing model provides an improvement over the basic Davis and Heathcote (2005) framework
with respect to house price volatility but does so at the cost of greater volatility of several key real
variables. These results suggest that adjustment costs might improve the models characteristics.
5.1.2 Adding Adjustment Costs
Adjustment costs are added using the functional form given in eq. (17) and the model is solved
under four di¤erent permutations of the adjustment costs parameter: (k; h) = (0:0; 0:2) : The
second moments from the simulated data are presented in Tables (8)and (9) : In all simulations,
we adjust the volatility of risk shocks (!) so that the model matches the volatility of house prices
as seen in the data.
Turning rst to volatility (Table (8)), it is seen that when adjustment costs are added only
to housing production, the model improves on several dimensions. First, the variance of the
risk shocks is dramatically reduced; in terms of the coe¢ cient of variation, this is reduced from
roughly 100% to 30%. Gilchrist, et al. (2008) provide estimates of time-varying uncertainty using
nancial data and they report an average volatility of 0 = 0:36 and ! = 0:14 or a coe¢ cient of
variation of 38% so the reduction in risk shocks in the model is clearly not unreasonable.21 With
adjustment costs in housing production, the volatility of real variables associated with the housing
sector are reduced and now are in line with the data. Note that the volatilities of the markup
21 Gilchrist et al. use a two-state Markov process for !t: Their estimates for this process are a low value of
0.25 and high value of 0.52 with a symmetric transition probability matrix with diagonal elements of 0.69. This
corresponds roughly to the coe¢ cient of variation reported in the text.
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Table 8: Standard Deviations relative to GDP - The role of adjustment costs
Variables Lending channel model (D & H) Data (+ 2s.d.)
(in relation to GDP) (1948 - 2007)
Adjustment cost k 0:0 0:0 0:2 0:2
Adjustment cost h 0:0 0:2 0:0 0:2
Volatility of ! 0.21 0.07 0.16 0.06
Private consumption (PCE) 0.55 0.52 0.68 0.64 0.48 0.78 (+ 0.15)
Labor (N ) 0.51 0.39 0.66 0.33 0.41 1.01 (+ 0.20)
Nonresidential investment (ic) 5.28 3.16 2.63 2.52 3.21 2.51 (+ 0.45)
Residential investment (id) 23.5 4.82 16.2 4.67 6.12 5.04 (+ 0.98)
House price (ph) 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36 0.4 1.36 (+ 0.31)
Construction output (xb) 10.9 3.27 7.97 3.41 4.02 2.74 (+ 0.53)
Manufacturing output (xm) 1.47 1.52 1.47 1.55 1.58 1.85 (+ 0.36)
Service output (xs) 1.05 0.99 0.90 0.97 0.99 0.85 (+ 0.16)
Construction labor (nb) 10.5 2.15 7.49 2.09 2.15 2.37 (+ 0.45)
Manufacturing (nm) 0.39 0.38 0.53 0.31 0.39 1.53 (
+
 0.30)
Service (ns) 0.61 0.38 0.30 0.28 0.37 0.66 (+ 0.13)
Construction Investment (ib) 10.6 2.39 7.51 2.37 25.9 9.69 (+ 1.88)
Manufacturing Investment (im) 1.02 1.05 1.02 1.04 3.23 3.53 (+ 0.69)
Service Investment (is) 1.1 1.05 0.94 1.02 3.43 2.91 (
+
 0.46)
Markup (s) 3.73 1.76 3.1 1.7 0.96 (+ 0.22)
Risk premium (RP ) 1.51 0.69 1.25 0.67 20.6 (4.92)
parameter and risk premium are also reduced but neither matches what is seen in the data. When
adjustment costs are only in capital accumulation (column 3), the model improves in related sectors
(consumption and non-residential investment), but the housing sector and associated inputs are
too volatile. Also the volatility of risk shocks necessary to produce the observed house price
volatility is twice as great relative to the previous case. The model performs quite well when both
capital and housing adjustment costs are present.
The contemporaneous correlations for several variables are reported in Table (9) : Capital
adjustment costs only (column 3) do not improve the models behavior (and produce a counter-
factually negative correlation of housing prices and GDP) while housing adjustment costs produce
a positive correlation between residential investment and private consumption and non-residential
and residential investment; albeit both are lower than observed in the data. When both adjust-
ment costs are present, the model produces qualitatively many of the features seen in the data but
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Table 9: Correlations
Variables Lending channel model D & H Data (+ 2s.d.)
Adjustment cost k 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Adjustment cost h 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
! 0.21 0.07 0.16 0.06
(GDP;PCE) 0.81 0.96 0.55 0.95 0.95 0.79 (+0.08,-0.12)
(GDP; ph) 0.08 0.10 -0.03 0.16 0.65 0.73 (+0.13,-0.22)
(ic; PCE) 0.64 0.89 0.78 0.91 0.91 0.61 (+0.15,0.20)
(id; PCE) -0.19 0.19 -0.43 0.20 0.26 0.66 (+0.13,-0.18)
(ic; id) -0.80 0.0007 -0.25 0.19 0.15 0.25 (+0.23,-0.27)
(id; ph) -0.68 -0.69 -0.86 -0.63 -0.2 0.34 (+0.22,-0.26)
(s; ph) 0.83 0.90 0.93 0.88 0.55 (+0.21,-0.30)
(s;GDP ) -0.20 -0.03 -0.3 -0.02 0.11 (+0.33,-0.36)
(RP;GDP ) -0.20 -0.03 -0.30 -0.02 -0.65 (+0.29,-0.18)
several important inconsistencies are present. The model continues to produces a negative corre-
lation between housing prices and residential investment (this feature is present for all variations
of the model). Again, given that explicit demand shocks are not present in the model, this result
is not unexpected. The cyclical properties of the two lending channel variables are mixed: while
both are weakly countercyclical this is broadly in line with the observed behavior of the markup
but does not match the strong countercyclical behavior of the risk premium.
The last set of housing stylized facts that is in question is the lead - lag patterns of residential
and non-residential investments. Table 10 shows the results. As in Davis and Heathcote (2005), we
also fail to reproduce this feature of the data. Consequently, the propagation mechanism of agency
costs model does amplify prices and other real variables, but does not contribute in explaining the
lead-lag features.
5.2 Dynamics: Impulse Response Functions
While the results discussed above provide some support for the housing cum credit channel model,
the role of the lending channel is not easily seen because of the presence of the other impulse shocks
(i.e., the sectoral productivity shocks). To analyze how the lending channel inuences the e¤ects
of a risk shock, we initially analyze the models impulse response functions to risk shocks under
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Table 10: Lead - Lag Patterns: Di¤erent Levels of Adjustment Costs
Variables Lending channel model D & H Data (+ 2 s.d.)
Adjustment cost k 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Adjustment cost h 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
! 0.21 0.07 0.16 0.06
(ic [ 1] ; GDP [0]) 0.37 0.54 0.49 0.54 0.45 0.25(+0.24,-0.27)
(ic [0] ; GDP [0]) 0.29 0.93 0.68 0.95 0.94 0.75 (+0.10,-0.15)
(ic [1] ; GDP [0]) 0.14 0.32 0.35 0.60 0.33 0.47 (+0.18,-0.24)
(id [ 1] ; GDP [0]) -0.07 0.10 -0.02 0.17 0.19 0.52 (+0.17,-0.23)
(id [0] ; GDP [0]) 0.32 0.32 0.48 0.42 0.44 0.47 (+0.19,-0.24)
(id [1] ; GDP [0]) 0.10 0.31 0.14 0.29 0.14 -0.22 (+0.27,-0.24)
(ic [ 1] ; id [0]) 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.19 0.07 -0.37 (+0.26,-0.21)
(ic [0] ; id [0]) -0.80 0.0007 -0.25 0.19 0.15 0.25 (+0.24,-0.27)
(ic [1] ; id [0]) 0.06 -0.09 -0.37 0.008 0.08 0.53 (+0.17,-0.23)
two di¤erent scenarios. In the rst scenario, we set the monitoring cost parameter to zero ( = 0)
while in the second scenario we use the value employed in the stochastic simulations ( = 0:25) :
With no monitoring costs, risk shocks should not inuence the behavior of housing prices and
residential investment (see eqs. (39) ; (56) ; and (57) : We also examine the economys response
to an innovation to productivity in the construction sector (this being the most important input
into the residential investment good). The impulse response functions (to a 1% innovation in
both shocks) for a selected set of key variables are presented in Figures 7-9. For all cases, both
adjustment cost parameters are set equal to 0.2.
We rst turn to the behavior of three key macroeconomic variables, namely GDP, household
consumption (denoted PCE), and residential investment (denoted RESI) seen in Figure 7. The
response to a technology shock to the construction sector has the predicted e¤ect that GDP
increases. Consumption also increases, but only slightly, while investment responds dramatically
(recall, that this is in the presence of adjustment costs). This consumption/savings decision
reects agents response to the expected high productivity (due to the persistence of the shock) in
the construction sector. Also note that monitoring costs (i.e. whether  = 0 or  = 0:25) play a
rather insignicant role in the dynamic e¤ects of a technology shock. And, as the model implies,
when  = 0, risk shocks have no e¤ect on the economy. (For this reason, in Figures 8 and 9,
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we report only the responses for  = 0:25.) When  = 0:25; a risk shock which a¤ects housing
production results in a modest fall in GDP but a relatively dramatic fall in residential investment.
Recall, as discussed in the partial equilibrium analysis of the credit channel model, an increase in
productivity risk results in a leftward shift in the supply of housing; since residential investment
is the primary input into housing, it too falls in response to the increased risk. Consumption
responds positively which is consistent with models that have an investment specic technology
shock (e.g. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000)).
Figure 8 reports the impulse response functions of the housing markup, the risk premium
on loans to the housing producers and the bankruptcy rate. A positive technology shock to the
construction sector increases the demand for housing and, ceteris paribus, will result in an increase
in the price of housing. This will result in greater lending to the housing producers which will
result in a greater bankruptcy rate and risk premium; both of these e¤ects imply that the housing
markup will increase. Note the counterfactual implication that both the bankruptcy rate and
the risk premium on loans will be procyclical; this was also the case in the original Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) model and for exactly the same reason. In contrast, a risk shock produces
countercyclical behavior in these three variables. Hence, this argues for inclusion of risk shocks as
an important impulse mechanism in the economy.
Finally, we report in Figure 9, the impulse response functions of the prices of land and housing
to the two shocks. A technology shock to the construction sector results in lower cost of housing
inputs due to the increased output in residential investment so that the price of housing falls.
However, the price of land, i.e. the xed factor, increases. For an uncertainty shock, the resulting
fall in the supply of housing causes the demand for the xed factor (land) to fall and the price of
the nal good (housing) to increase.
In ending this section, a word of caution is needed in interpreting the quantitative magnitudes
seen in the impulse response functions. In particular, note that the response of housing prices to
a productivity increase in the construction sector is greater than the response due to a risk shock.
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One might deduce that the housing sector and risks shocks play a minor role in the movement of
housing prices. As the results from the full model (i.e. when the all technology and risk shocks
are present) imply, such a conclusion would be incorrect (see Table 8).
5.3 Some Final Remarks
Our primary ndings fall into two broad categories. First, risk shocks to the housing producing
sector imply a quantitatively large role for uncertainty over the housing and business cycles.
Second, our model can account for many of the salient features of housing stylized facts, in
particular, housing prices are more volatile than output. Critically, however, adjustment costs,
especially in housing accumulation, are necessary to mute the volatility in the real side of the
economy produced by risk shocks. The lead - lag pattern of residential and non-residential,
however, is still not reconciled within our framework.22
For future research, modelling uncertainty due to time variation in the types of entrepreneurs
would be fruitful. One possibility would be an economy with a low risk agent whose productivity
shocks exhibit low variance and a high risk agent with a high variance of productivity shocks.
Because of restrictions on the types of nancial contracts that can be o¤ered, the equilibrium
is a pooling equilibrium so that the same type of nancial contract is o¤ered to both types of
agents. Hence the aggregate distribution for technology shocks hitting the entrepreneurial sector
is a mixture of the underlying distributions for each type of agent. Our conjecture is that this
form of uncertainty has important quantitative predictions and, hence, could be an important
impulse mechanism in the credit channel literature that, heretofore, has been overlooked. It also
anecdotally corresponds with explanations for the cause of the current credit crisis: a substantial
fraction of mortgage borrowers had higher risk characteristics than originally thought.
However, the most glaring omission in our analysis is that of demand disturbances. Incorporat-
ing shifts in housing demand that are fundamental based (i.e. without appealing to asset bubble
22 Recently, Jonas Fisher (2007) presents a model with household production which does produce the lead-lag
pattern pattern observed in residential and non-residential investment.
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explanations) which can produce large swings in housing prices remains a substantial modeling
hurdle.
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6 Data Appendix
 Loans: Federal Reserve Board, Statistics: Releases and Historical Data Assets and Liabilities
of Commercial Banks in the U.S. - h.8. Seasonally adjusted, adjusted for mergers, billions
of dollars. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/data.htm
Total Loans: Total loans and leases at commercial banks.
Residential Real Estate Loans: Loans to residential sector excluding revolving home
equity loans.
Commercial Real Estate Loans: Loans to commercial sector excluding revolving home
equity loans.
Commercial and Industrial Loans (Business Loans): Commercial and industrial loans
at all Commercial Banks.
Consumer Loans: Consumer (Individual) loans at all commercial banks.
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE), Aggregate of
gross private domestic investment (Non-RESI), Residential gross private domestic investment
(RESI), and the Price Indexes for private residential Investment (PRESI) are all from the
National Income and Product Accounts Tables (NIPA) at the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
To calculate the implied markup, s, we used the house price index (HPI), residential
investment (RESI) and the price for the RESI (PRESI).
We use the equation pht = (1  ) y dt pdtst:
 House Price Index. (HPI): Constructed based on conventional conforming mortgage trans-
actions obtained from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation(Freddie Mac) and the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Source: The O¢ ce of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).
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 Risk Premium: To calculate our risk premium, we used the spread between the prime rate
and the three month commercial paper. These data can be obtained from Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, FRED Dataset under the category of Interest Rates.
 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/22. These two series are monthly.
Commercial rate: CP3M, 3-Month Commercial Paper Rate :1971-04 till 1997-08.
Prime rate: MPRIME, Bank Prime Loan Rate: 1949-01 till 2009-08.
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Figure 1: U.S. GDP, House Price, Non – and Residential Fixed Investments (1975:1 – 
2007:2) 
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Figure 2:  Different Loans at All U.S. Commercial Banks (1990:1 to 2007:7) 
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Figure 3: U.S. GDP, House Price and Residential Real Estate Loans 
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Figure 4: House Price, Housing Markups, and Risk Premium 
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Figure 5:  Flow of Funds in Credit Channel with Housing Model 
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Figure 6: Technology and Uncertainty Shocks: 
Effects on Housing Demand and Supply 
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Figure 7:  Response of Output, Private Consumption Expenditure, and Investment 
to 1% increase in Sector (Construction) Technology shocks and Uncertainty 
Shocks 
(percentage deviations from steady-state values) 
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Figure 8:  Response of Markup House Price, Risk Premia, and Bankruptcy Rate to a 
1% increase in Sector (Construction) Technology shocks and Uncertainty Shocks 
(percentage deviations from steady-state values) 
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Figure 9:  Response of Land Price and House Price to a 1% increase in Sector 
(Construction) Technology Shocks and Uncertainty Shocks 
 (percentage deviations from steady-state values) 
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